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5 JAN 1954

TO: SA/COF
FROM: Chief, AR/3
SUBJECT: Aerodynamic/Operational

1. It had become apparent in the AERODYNAMIC Project that in order to preserve the Ukrainian underground on a long range basis for the benefit of all concerned and to turn to a new source for agent recruits and other Ukrainian personnel to be involved in the project, it was necessary to implement a new plan of action. Taking the initiative in this respect, the AERODYNAMIC case officers, using as a basis Annex "A", presented CASSOWARY 2 with our plan for the reorganization of the operation. In the discussions on this topic which followed, it was learned that CASSOWARY 2 also realized the need for the strengthening of the homeland structure and agreed, almost completely, with the facts presented him concerning the current situation and the general plan devised to handle the problem. With the exception of two major points, to be discussed presently, the entire plan as outlined in Annex A was agreed to by CASSOWARY 2.

2. His first rejection was regarding the complete transfer of operational control of the underground to a center abroad. CASSOWARY 2 felt that although a operational center abroad should be established, the controlling center of the underground should be located in the Ukraine because, a) the psychological factor inherent in the presence physically of a body called the center in the Ukraine was needed to preserve the life of the underground even if that underground is reduced to a bare minimum, b) those in the Ukraine are best qualified to direct their local activities even though supported and advised by the center abroad. CASSOWARY 2's second rejection was regarding the sending of either CASSOWARY 4 or 6 to the homeland for the purpose of explaining the plan to headquarters there. CASSOWARY 2 agreed that either of these two would be the logical people to carry out such an assignment but among other reasons in rejecting both, pointed out the security aspect in that both were too familiar with past operations to risk on such a mission. We agreed with this point.

3. After a closer study of Annex A, a general plan of action was agreed upon by CASSOWARY 2 and the AERODYNAMIC case officers. On the basis of this agreement, CASSOWARY 2 formulated a message to Bruin, some of which has already been transmitted to him. (See Annex B). Briefly, the plan calls for the following: a) solidification of the headquarters structure in the Ukraine supported by a peripheral structure of subordinate groups to be headed by present leadership members of the underground, b) the establishment of individual methods of internal contact between subordinate

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groups and the Center (homeland headquarters), between the Center in the Ukraine and the center abroad and between the subordinate groups and the center abroad, a) the utilization by each individual group of its own established legal centers, b) the establishment of black bases to be supported by a legal structure, each opened to cover the largest area possible and each of which can also serve as subordinate group centers, c) the re-densing of instructions to the entire underground for the plan of future action, d) the recruitment of latent members of the underground who would be provided with instructions to be followed only in the event of open warfare, and e) the establishment of infiltration routes across GERMANY to accommodate the infiltration of members of the Ukrainian underground collected to participate in the order of their importance, 1-80. Provide members who would be included in the center abroad to participate in the directing of the operations, legals who would be trained and dispatched as w/ operators or residents supporting black bases, non-legals to be trained to run black bases and serve as w/ operators.

b. The implementation of this plan, as GASSOWAY 2 sees it is the only subtraction for the Ukrainian underground on a long range basis and under existing circumstances. From our side, it is hoped that a successful implementation of the plan will provide us with a constant flow of agent recruits, both legals and illegals, sources of current information as might be obtained from newly arrived personnel, assets covering a wide area of the Ukraine, a better flow of intelligence and a core of underground members around which could be built the resistance force of the Ukrainian people in time of war.

5. As mentioned in para 1, a primary consideration of the plan is the source it will provide for future agent personnel. Our existing assets in the Ukraine, w/o-also, are limited. This fact has been considered both by us and by GASSOWAY 2. From the vantage point of preparing additional personnel either to be needed to substitute for those already operating or to be dispatched for a wider area coverage. In this respect, it had been GASSOWAY 2's original contention that only with the creation of a cadre school could proper agents be recruited. However, when notified that this method of recruitment could not be set-up, GASSOWAY 2 attempted to recruit in the United States. Here, the limitations in recruitment from a security standpoint so curtailed his actions that he date no recruits have been obtained. Recruitment in Canada and South America also had the limitations, therefore no attempt was made there for this purpose. The only other possible source for recruits, excluding of course the means expected in the operational plan outlined, is Europe. Here it was hoped, and still is, that with the settlement of the dispute between GAVATINA 1 and the CP, and with the presence of GAVATINA 16 in Germany, some candidates could be recruited. Today, however, no results have been forthcoming although it is still possible that some recruits will be gotten.

Even so, it is doubtful whether any of the candidates recruited in Europe, or in America for that matter, could possibly be used in the

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legal aspect of the operation. Because of their waning motivation and estrangement from Ukrainian reality, it is suspected that only a few could qualify as black base w/t operators, and then only as a last resort in the event those in the homeland fail to exfiltrate.

6. Under the above considerations, taking into account the time factor, it is expected that no agent recruits will be available for training in the AERODYNAMIC Project before the middle of 1954 and none to be ready for dispatch until late 1954 and possibly not until the spring of 1955. Those first to be considered for training are the couriers anticipated to exfiltrate sometime this spring or early summer. In the event candidates are spotted in Europe in the mean time, it is planned to withhold their recruitment until it is found certain that the couriers will not appear. Here, it is felt that for the implementation of the newly created plan the most suitable recruits are those exfiltrated specifically for this purpose or who most nearly will meet the requirements of the plan. All others will be considered only if those from the homeland fail to exfiltrate after a certain period of time, or if it is convenient to integrate them with newly arrived personnel.

7. Headquarters request to DOS for its support in the exfiltration operation has been initiated and it is expected that DOS will at least duplicate the effort it made last year to aid in the initial and future exfiltrations.

8. Some question might arise as to the reasons for transmitting via w/t the operational plan outlined above, especially when considered from the security aspect. These reasons are as follows. a) Since Hrusin officially signed off for the winter in the customary manner, he was undoubtedly clean, and, barring capture during the winter months, (unlikely if partisan procedures are followed whereby he will sit tight until spring) will remain clean for sometime to come. b) Transmission of the plan now will give Hrusin ample time to digest the plan sufficiently enough to present it to his headquarters and to prepare, too, any questions or answers he may have regarding it which could be brought out by couriers he plans to send West early this year. c) Since Hrusin might have difficulty re-establishing contact with Koval this summer necessitating his separation from Hak and the usual long delay in w/t coordination, etc., it is felt now is the time to furnish Hrusin with all important data concerning the future operations. d) It was originally planned to have some member of the IF infiltrate for the purpose of personally presenting the plan to the homeland headquarters. This method of presentation, of course, would have been the ideal way to do this, however, personnel limitations forced the cancellation of such action. For example, GASSOWARIES 4 and 6 were both considered for the assignment but due to their extensive knowledge of past operations, American personnel, etc., both were discounted on security grounds.

9. Based on the current status of the operation and lack of agent candidates for the AERODYNAMIC project at the present time, it is recommended that DOS be advised to cancel any preparations it might have made or is preparing to make to handle AERODYNAMIC agent recruits.

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DAVID E. WULFMEY

1. Present situation in the Ukraine regarding the Aerodynamic Operation

- a. No effective centralization or communication
- b. No effective legal structure
- c. No information on the Ukraine
- d. Movements restricted to Carpathian Mt. districts

2. Desirable end

- a. Transfer of operational control to center abroad, i.e., EP (see para 3c below.)
- b. Reduction of bunker force to three or four illegal installations with:

- i. maximum geographic coverage
- ii. maximum technical equipment
- iii. minimum personnel and support
- iv. no lateral contact without HQ permission

c. Establishment of legal structure in order to:

- i. Service black bases with equipment and food and to cut down number of air drops
- ii. Provide information
- iii. Spread to the East
- iv. Give underground more staying power

3. Means of accomplishing this end

a. Dispatch EP emissary to homeland

- i. Train either Cassowary 4 or 6 and at least one W/T man for dispatch
- ii. Brief either Cass 4 or 6 fully on all new approaches
- iii. Drop either Cass 4 or 6 to a selected MZ

b. Arrange preparations now for a relatively large scale exfiltration via CSB-BWA

- i. Set up caches with maps, instructions, money, documents, etc.
- ii. Have couriers and guides prepared from Berlin side

c. Exfiltrate from the Ukraine in this order:

- i. Leaders to participate in directing from abroad, including Hrusin and either Cass 4 or 6, the above new operation
- ii. Legals who could be trained and sent back to a legal structure
- iii. Partisans to run new black bases
- iv. Non-legalizable exfiltrates

d. Legalize all four in para 3c above by:

- i. Providing documents
- ii. Providing suitable cover stories

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ANNEX "B"

"Material aid for you can only be realized upon our receipt from you early in the spring your plan for receiving this aid. Take into consideration the time factor, weather, terrain, enemy activity and technical aspects for receiving this aid. Give us two selected DI's and plans for receipt of this aid. Also work out the plan for receiving our aid from within as we suggested to you recently. This plan is good and should be tried out. The main consideration here is secure addresses, free from enemy interest. We are doing all we can in order that you receive aid in this manner but at the same time do not suffer losses. Early dispatch of couriers is indispensable. We need information and must summarize the situation there as well as possibilities for the future. If possible, dispatch here a group of young people who have completed at least highschool and who have been living there legally. People in the emigration have become estranged from the life and situation in the homeland and could become a burden to you. We think that according to the present situation, it is necessary for you to adopt a new long range plan for the purpose of preserving the ideal of the liberation struggle, its concepts and structure, for the day of open warfare. Active armed struggle can only be resumed if the physical leadership center is preserved, which in turn preserves the structural stand of the movement, the ideal behind it and the program of the struggle. The brain center of the revolution must be preserved even at the cost of the network and weakening of contacts with the people.

"We propose the creation of independent groups of the movement from the leadership members of the Center who will only maintain contact with each other and then only within the framework of the long range plan. These groups will be isolated from each other. Each member of the underground will know the purpose and method of the struggle for the future years. The groups should not confine their interests to only one terrain. Instead, each group should have as wide an area of operation as possible, and withdraw from that terrain in which there is the most activity (enemy). Each group should have direct contact with us as per agreement and instruction from the Center, and we, in the event of need, will aid the Center renew broken contacts and give aid to each group. The Center will contact us either directly or through its groups. For internal contacts, do not introduce the use of previously built nets but instead fashion individual systems of contacts. The chain system of contact must not be dependent on one key individual, but should be changed constantly. Along with these groups, we propose the creation of separate nets of individual members who will live legally or semi-legally and who will be provided with necessary documents with our help. These members would not have any contact with each other but only with the Center and then only via dead drops. They would also be given the instructions for long range operations. Their tasks would be to gather information and to become well acquainted with the activity in the terrain in which they reside.

"As the third net we propose the establishment of reserve cadres also based on individual principles. If possible, choose in every rayon or terrain at least one person who has the opportunity or facility to maintain himself legally for the longest possible time. A member of the underground will

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contact this person once and give him, or show or notify him where is buried, a standard package containing instructions, explanations and materials to be used when notified. When this person agrees to the above proposition, he will himself hide the package, keeping its whereabouts strictly to himself. Besides this one contact between the member of the underground and the member of this reserve cadre, there should not be any further contacts, and this person should not undertake any underground work. This reserve net would be used for future activity. We believe that at least a part of this net would carry out its assignment when necessary. A part of the apparatus of the underground should take on the responsibility of compiling instructions, materials and constructing individual standard packages. Carry separately parts of the archives and let us know exactly where each was buried so that someday they may be retrieved for use in the historical record."

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